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A.: Wills--Construction of Contingent Limitation--"or" Construed to M
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
argument, the other extreme from which is that remedial statutes
should be liberally construed, scarcely is needed here. If the statute
can be regarded as remedial from the standpoint of the state in the
matter of taxation, it is in no wise remedial as between creditor
and debtor, or as applied to pleading. But this obviously is a penal
statute, and for that reason as well, ought to receive a strict construction.
It may be that, in supporting the result arrived at, the opinion
of Judge Fox proceeds upon the safer ground; but the view of
the majority opinion, confined to the facts, seems sound enough.
C. L. C.
WILLS

-

CONSTRUCTION

OF

CONTINGENT

LIMITATION-

"OR"

"AND".--TestatrLx devised property to her
husband for life, after his death to her daughter and the heirs of
her body forever. Should the daughter die before coming of age
or without heir or heirs of her body, then over to the children of
two cousins. The daughter died at the age of 59 without issue.
Held, that the word or must be construed and; and that the daughter became vested with a fee simple estate at age of twenty-one.
Jordan v. Jordan.'
CONSTRUED

TO MEAN

There is a long line of auhorities, both English2 and American 3,
which lay down the rule of construction applied by the court in
this case to the effect that a limitation of dying under age or without issue should be construed as under age and without issue. This
rule is based on the theory that the testator intended to benefit the
issue of the devisee and would not want this benefit to depend on
the single condition of the devisee reaching twenty-ond and at
the same time would not want the devisee to be required to have
issue to be able to take when he reaches twenty-one. This rule
has been applied, however, only in the case of a devise of a fee
simple absolute.
In the'case of a devise of a fee tail, subject to the limitation
of the devisee reaching twenty-one or having issue, the same rea1119 W. Va. 268, 193 S. E. 338 (1937).
2 Soulle v. Gerrard, Cro. Eliz. 525, 78 Eng. Rep. R. 773 (1595); Framlingham v. Brand, 3 Atk. 390, 26 Eng. Rep. R. 1024 (1746) ; Price v. Hunt, Pollex.
645, 86 Eng. Rep. R. 674 (1696); Barker v. Suretees, 2 Strange 1175, 93
Eng. Rep. R. 1109 (1743).
8 Williams v. Ricks, 182 N. C. 112, 108 S. E. 394 (1921); Note (1910)
25 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1156, citing Brewer v. Opie, 1 Call 212 (Va. 1798).
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soning does not apply, and the or is not changed to ad. 4 In these
cases the testator has shown his intent that the devise was for the
benefit of the devisee's issue, rather than the devisee himself, by
giving a fee tail instead of a fee simple. Thus it is absolutely in
accord with his intent to hold that if the devisee die under twentyone, there is a gift over by way of a shifting executory devise;
but if he reach twenty-one, he then becomes tenant in tail and the
gift over will operate as a remainder after an estate tail. This
holding, however, has the effect of cutting off the issue of a devisee
dying under age, which is contrary to the presumed intent of the
testator to benefit the issue, but in accord with his manifest intent
to benefit the gift over man.
In the principal case, the rule as to the cases where the primary gift was of a fee tail is not mentioned, and it is doubtful that
it would have had any effect on the decision because the court
holds that the statute converting a fee tail into a fee simple5 applies
to the gift to the daughter making it a gift of a fee simple. The
court appears to be using the statute to determine the testatrix's
intent, rather than determining her intent and then applying
the statute, on the theory that the testatrix did not Imow the technical effect of the words "and the heirs of her body forever,"
really intending to give her daughter a fee simple absolute. The
court, with equal logic, might have reached the opposite result,
by construing the will first, and then applying the disentailing
statute.
J. C. A.
4 Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. Sr. 243, 28 Eng. Rep. R. 157 (1750);
Contra:
Grey v. Pearson, 6 H. L. Cas. 61, 10 Eng. Rep. R. 1216 (1857).
Holcomb v. Lake, 25 N. J. L. 605 (1855).
IV. VA. Rsv. CoDE (Michie, 1937) c. 36, art. 1, § 12.
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